KDI | KIMPACT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE

ASSESSING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BALLOT

The 2024 Edo & Ondo
Governorship Elections

ASSESSING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BALLOT

Disclaimer

This document has been produced by Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) to provide information on the findings of her Ballot Integrity Project – an effort that analyses the election results data available on the INEC Result Viewing portal (IReV) and evaluates the overall integrity of the electoral process in the 2024 Edo and Ondo States off-cycle governorship elections. Kimpact hereby certifies that all the views expressed in this document accurately reflect the analytical views of the information gathered on IReV, the desk review with election experts and secondary electoral data from desk research, which were verified, reliable and evidence based. Whilst reasonable care has been taken in preparing this document, KIMPACT shall take no responsibility for errors, any views expressed, or actions taken due to information provided in this report.

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Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) is an independent non-governmental organisation that advances good governance, democratic rights, public policy, and public engagement. We do this by building informed and active citizens through capacity development, advancing public policies, data-driven advocacy, and reforms that create a more supportive environment for citizen-led development.

OUR MISSION: To inspire citizen-led democratic development that is anchored on the principles of participation, data-driven advocacy, strong democratic institutions, and public policies.

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Every day, at KIMPACT, we are committed to inspiring citizen-led democracy development. We do this because behind every thriving democracy with dividends lies active and informed citizens.

At KIMPACT, we believe in a democracy that truly works for everyone.

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Executive Summary →

The 2024 Edo and Ondo Governorship Election BIP Report presents a detailed assessment of the electoral process, focusing on the accuracy of election result management, transparency in result transmission, and overall electoral integrity. Using data from polling units, state collation centres, and the INEC Results Viewing (IReV) portal, this study highlights significant trends, discrepancies, and areas for reform to strengthen Nigeria's electoral process.

Key Findings

One of the most striking findings of this study was the persistent mismatch in the number of registered voters across multiple polling units. In Edo State, inconsistencies were found in 141 polling units, while in Ondo, the same issue was observed in 87 polling units. These discrepancies extended beyond individual polling stations to the final collation centres, where the total number of registered voters recorded was significantly different from INEC's pre-election figures . Edo State recorded a shortfall of 18,340 voters at the final collation stage, while Ondo State had a discrepancy of 1,926 voters. Despite the persistence of these mismatches, Ondo demonstrated notable progress compared to the 2020 elections, reducing its discrepancies by 41%. In contrast, Edo State showed only a marginal improvement of 7.2%, raising concerns about the effectiveness of electoral data management in the state.

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Website: www.inecnigeria.org Online Newspaper.www.inecnews.com
PRESS RELEASE

RELEASE OF THE FINAL REGISTER OF VOTERS FOR EDO AND ONDO STATES

The Commission met today, Tuesday 6th August 2024, and approved the final register of voters for the Edo and Ondo Governorship elections. The register integrated new voters from the recent Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) as well as the figures of successful applicants for transfer from other States of the Federation to the two States.

Edo State
The State now has 2,629,025 registered voters. Of this figure, 1,370,061 (52.11%) are male while 1,258,964 (47.89%) are female. Youths (18 - 35 years) account for 983,133 (37.4%), followed by 914,806 middle aged (36 - 49) persons. Together, they constitute 1,897,939 (72.2%) of registered voters in the State.

In terms of occupation, 868,764 students constitute the majority of voters (33.05%). There are 4,199 (0.16%) Persons with Disability (PWDs).

The new register represents 4.9% increase over the 2023 General Election figure of 2,501,081.

Ondo State
The State now has 2,053,061 registered voters. Of this figure, 1,034,006 (50.36%) are male while 1,019,055 (49.64%) are female. Youths (18 - 35 years) account for 726,944 (35.41%), followed by 721,982 (35.17%) middle aged (36 - 49) persons. Together, they constitute 1,448,926 (70.57%) of registered voters in the State.

In terms of occupation, 694,938 students constitute the majority of voters (33.85%). There are 1,782 (0.09%) Persons with Disability (PWDs).

The new register represents a 3.0% increase over the 2023 General Election figure of 1,191,344.

Detailed Breakdown
The datailed breakdown of the register for each State by Local Government Areas, gender, age, occupation and disability has been uploaded to our website and social media platforms for public information.

Another critical issue uncovered was the surge in arithmetic errors, particularly in Edo State.

The number of arithmetic inconsistencies in election result computation skyrocketed from 150 cases in 2020 to 426 in 2024, marking a 184% increase. This dramatic rise indicates serious lapses in the collation process and highlights the need for stricter verification mechanisms. Ondo State, on the other hand, showed a commendable reduction in arithmetic errors, improving by 69% compared to the previous election cycle. The contrast between the two states demonstrates that while improvements are possible, Edo's situation suggests a worrying decline in result accuracy.

The issue of mismatch between accredited voters and total votes cast was another major finding, with a significant number of votes unaccounted for in both states. In Ondo, 12,932 ballots were unaccounted for, while Edo recorded a far higher number, with 29,053 ballots unaccounted for at the polling unit level. Even after the collation process was completed, Edo still had 20,167 unaccounted ballots, while Ondo had 1,899 unaccounted ballots. The stark difference between the two states is concerning, particularly as

Edo's unaccounted ballot figures increased by 131% compared to 2020, while Ondo managed to improve ballot accountability by reducing unaccounted ballots by 70%. This raises questions about the administration of elections in Edo and suggests potential gaps in oversight and transparency.

Overvoting also emerged as a significant problem, with inflated numbers recorded at polling units. Edo State had overvoting in 382 polling units, with a total of 8,887 excess votes, while Ondo recorded overvoting in 183 polling units, amounting to 4,045 excess votes. These excess votes were at the state collation centre, suggesting that figures may have been reconciled at the ward or local government level before reaching the final tally.

Further inconsistencies were observed between the IReV portal and the official state collation reports. In Edo State, IReV recorded 22 instances of Form EC40G uploads, indicating that elections were either cancelled or not held in specific polling units across 11 local government areas. However, at the state collation centre, only three local government collation

officers acknowledged these cancelled elections, leaving eight LGAs unaccounted for in official statements. A similar pattern was observed in Ondo State, where IReV recorded 19 instances of Form EC40G uploads across seven LGAs, confirming that elections were either annulled or not conducted in certain polling units. However, only Okitipupa LGA acknowledged election annulments at the collation centre, raising concerns about transparency and accountability in the electoral process.

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Recommendations

1. Strengthening the Accuracy of Election Result Management

- Upgrade Form EC8A to pre-record registered voter numbers to prevent polling unit discrepancies.

- Implement real-time verification at collation stages to prevent arithmetic errors before finalising results.

2. Preventing Over-Voting Through Enhanced Voter Accreditation Checks

- Mandate BVAS-generated accreditation summaries are to be attached to Form EC8A and uploaded to IReV.

3. Improving Transparency in Result Transmission

- Enhance the IReV portal to allow result uploads beyond polling units to track results at ward, LGA, and state collation levels.

- Restore the BVAS "synchronisation number" feature on IReV to verify accredited voter data and detect overvoting.

4. Enhancing Electoral Accountability

- Create a public complaints portal before elections for direct reporting of irregularities to INEC.

- Impose strict penalties on electoral officials found guilty of result manipulation, including lifetime bans.

5. Ensuring Fairness in Cases of Electoral Discrepancies

- Require automatic reviews for high-risk polling units (e.g., when turnout exceeds 90% or there are significant discrepancies between IReV and collation centre figures).

- Maintain a public log of cancelled votes, listing reasons and affected polling units.

6. Legal and Policy Reforms for Electoral Integrity

- Mandate digital collation for elections with more than 500,000 registered voters.

- Set a standardised timeframe for result announcements to prevent undue delays and manipulation.

- Strengthen campaign finance regulations to reduce undue influence over election officials.

The 2024 Edo and Ondo governorship elections revealed progress in some areas but persistent challenges in electoral integrity, result accuracy, and transparency. Ondo showed improvements in reducing mismatches, arithmetic errors, and unaccounted ballots, while Edo recorded significant setbacks, with rising discrepancies and overvoting issues. To strengthen the credibility of future elections, INEC must adopt urgent reforms to improve result management, prevent discrepancies, and ensure transparency at all collation levels. These measures will enhance public trust in the electoral process and reinforce Nigeria's democratic integrity.

01.

Introduction and Background

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1.1 Historical context for election result management in Nigeria.

Elections are the lifeblood of any democracy. It is an essential process that allows citizens to collectively choose their leaders and shape the governance of their society. Over centuries, electoral practices have evolved remarkably, from ancient practices such as negative voting in Greece, where people could exile undesirable leaders for a decade[1], to modern systems like first-past-the-post, also known as the simple majority, and more complex electoral formulas adopted by democracies worldwide. Nigeria also, across both presidential and governorship elections, determines its leaders through a simple majority.

However, the act of voting represents just one phase of the electoral cycle. The culmination of this process— the transmission and collation, all regarded as the management of results – is equally critical in manifesting the will of the people. The integrity of result management is important because it not only validates the electoral process but also fosters public trust in the results.

Mismanagement and manipulation have long plagued Nigeria's electoral cycle. Manipulation techniques[2] such as intimidation and violence, vote trading, ballot box snatching, underage and multiple voting, falsification of results, bribery, and information manipulation, have, over time, weakened public confidence in the electoral process. Other key issues, such as delayed collation, lack of transparency in the result management process and loopholes in technology, further undermine integrity in the process. These not only distort the electoral outcomes but also contribute to a persistent cycle of voter apathy and low turnout. Historical patterns[3] ranging from the 1983 electoral violence in Ondo State to more recent incidents during the 2023 general elections, show that these challenges are deeply entrenched in the electoral process.

In Nigeria, the journey of an election result begins at the polling unit level with the recording of votes on the result sheet called form EC8A[4]. Depending on the type of election, this process moves through different layers, where, for example, the polling unit result sheet is sent to the registration area (RA), also

called the ward, where results from various polling units are recorded on the Form EC8B and thereafter sent to the local government area (LGA) collation center.. At the LGA collation center, results from multiple wards are collated and recorded into Form EC8C, which is sent to the state collation centre, and there, results from different local government areas are recorded on Form EC8D. If it is a presidential election, the results from different states will proceed to the national collation centre, where they are then filled into the form EC8E. While these different layers of result management are necessary for ease of administration and oversight, they are also susceptible to manipulation in that only a select number of election officials[5] oversee this result management process, and the administration is often outside the glare of the public.

The introduction of the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), a digital tool designed to allow for the electronic uploading of Form EC8A directly from polling units, was expected to enhance electoral transparency and curb result manipulation in Nigeria. First deployed during the 2020[6] bye-election in Nasarawa State, IReV was heralded as a potential game-changer for election credibility. However, it has fallen short of these expectations. One major limitation is its reliance on human input, making it vulnerable to errors and deliberate manipulation. Instances from past elections have shown electoral officials uploading incorrect images, with some even mistakenly—or intentionally—uploading pictures of their faces[7] instead of result sheets.

Considering this, the Edo and Ondo governorship elections in 2024 are critical. Recent investigative reports[8] and preliminary data analyses have revealed alleged instances of irregularities at multiple levels of

> **Elections ensure democracy, but Nigeria faces manipulation, vote buying, and collation flaws. Despite IReV's introduction, Edo and Ondo 2024 elections still saw irregularities, discrepancies, and transparency issues affecting trust.**

result collation in both states. For example, in Edo State, there were reports[9] of manipulation at the polling unit level, allegedly designed to favour the incumbent party of the state , while manipulation was also allegedly designed at the ward and LGA collation levels to favour the national ruling party. Many election observation groups reported that ward collation was moved to the INEC office in the state, which was then used as the collation centre.

Ondo State, on the other hand, while showing some improvements in data reconciliation, still faced challenges with discrepancies and reported anomalies. There has also been inconsistency between the published number of registered voters before the election and what was released when the results were published. This was also the case in the Edo state election .

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1.2 Election Result Management in Edo and Ondo State: A Snapshot of the Historical Timeline.

Elections in Nigeria have been shaped by a complex interplay of institutional evolution, political dynamics, and technological advancements. Edo and Ondo states, both with a history of politically charged contests, have seen significant changes in election results management. Both states, which hold elections outside of the general election calendar, can be thought of as microcosms of the state of election results management in the country.

While efforts to improve transparency through technological interventions have been made over the years, issues such as logistical flaws, vote buying, and discrepancies in collation processes have persisted.

The 2012 Edo governorship election was marred by significant[10] logistical and operational inefficiencies, calling into question the credibility of the announced results and, invariably, the management of the result process. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) faced numerous challenges, including delayed distribution of election materials, particularly in rural areas, resulting in late voting in several polling units. These logistical deficiencies fueled public scepticism about the reliability of the result

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Elections in Edo and Ondo evolved with technology, improving logistics and transparency, yet challenges like vote buying, delayed collation, legal ambiguities, and result manipulation persisted, affecting public trust in the process.

collation. The delays in vote counting and reporting raised concerns about potential manipulations, highlighting the systemic weaknesses in Nigeria's electoral process at the time.

By the 2016 Edo governorship election, INEC had made notable improvements, particularly in logistics[11] and technology integration. This included the introduction of Smart Card Readers (SCRs) for voter accreditation, aimed at reducing incidents of multiple voting and electoral fraud. A technology that had been used in the previous year's general elections.

The distribution of election materials was more structured, resulting in better coordination and timeliness than the 2012 elections. The process also saw increased stakeholder engagement, particularly from civil society organisations, which increased public trust in the process.

Nonetheless, challenges remained. The legal framework for electronic accreditation was ambiguous, sparking debate about the role of smart card readers in the electoral process. Political actors challenged the validity of the results based on alleged discrepancies in voter authentication, demonstrating the difficulty of fully integrating new technologies without strong legislative backing.

For Ondo State, the 2012 election was generally regarded as fair; the incumbent governor had a popular vote, and it was considered one with a smooth transition. INEC's logistical challenge still came into play, but it was not as pronounced as that of Edo. Manual collation of polling unit results was done at all levels of the election, and as a result, there were accusations of falsification of results[12] and that a majority of lawful votes did not count.

The 2016 election in Ondo State was also generally regarded as unproblematic. Just like in Edo State, the Smart Card Reader was also used for the accreditation of voters. While there were no major delays in the distribution of election materials, there were reports of irregularities. Collation began late in some local governments, necessitating a suspension of the results announcement.

02.

About the Ballot Integrity Project

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2.1 Overview of the study

The Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) has been established as a response to these recurring challenges. With a focus on the 2024 Edo and Ondo governorship elections, BIP employs advanced statistical techniques—such as irregular cluster detection, cumulative vote analysis, and Benford's Law—to evaluate the integrity of the electoral process.

These techniques are effective in detecting electoral fraud in that they identify the anomalies in voting patterns. Irregular cluster detection, for instance, helps spot unusual vote distributions, indicating possible ballot stuffing or result manipulation. Cumulative vote analysis examines how votes accumulate over time, flagging unnatural trends like sudden surges in support for a candidate, which may suggest tampering. Benford's Law on its own assesses whether vote counts follow the expected logarithmic distribution; deviations may indicate artificial vote fabrication.

By leveraging data from the IReV portal and incorporating insights from independent election observers, the project aims to identify procedural irregularities, routine trends, and unusual anomalies in vote share distributions and result transmission that may undermine public trust in the electoral process.

BIP builds on the analytical foundations laid in "Beyond the Figures"[13], KDI's study of the off-cycle elections in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi states. This continuity allows for robust comparative analysis, offering insights into both improvements and persistent challenges in election result management over time. The goal is to enhance transparency and provide statistical and data-driven feedback and insights to the relevant electoral stakeholders, thereby contributing to the formulation of policies that enhance the transparency, efficiency, and credibility of Nigeria's electoral system.

The Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) analyzes Edo and Ondo's 2024 elections using statistical methods like irregular cluster detection, cumulative vote analysis, and Benford's Law to detect electoral fraud. Leveraging IReV data and observer insights, BIP builds on KDI's research to enhance transparency, identify anomalies, and provide data-driven feedback for improving Nigeria's electoral credibility.

2.2 Objectives and goals of the project.

The Ballot Integrity Project is of importance to various stakeholders within the electoral process. From the Election Management Bodies (EMB), such as the INEC, to Civil Society Organisations (CSO), citizens, and even bodies that oversee election petitions, like the judiciary. This benefit is reflected in several ways, such as ensuring increased transparency in the process; this will increase public trust in the process. It will also give leverage to different stakeholders who are dissatisfied with the election outcome and intend to pursue a form of justice.

2.3 Definition of Key Terms.

Understanding the terminology associated with election result management is important for interpreting the findings of this study. This section provides precise definitions of key terms used throughout the report to establish a clear conceptual framework and ensure consistency in analysis.

- **Election Result Management:** Election result management refers to the structured process of collecting, transmitting, verifying, collating, and announcing election results. This process ensures that votes cast at polling units are accurately recorded, securely transmitted, and fairly aggregated at various collation centres before the final declaration of winners. Efficient result management is critical to electoral integrity because it determines whether an election represents the true will of the people. A well-managed election results system should demonstrate:

  - *Transparency*: ensuring that the result collation process is accessible to stakeholders, including party agents, election observers, and the public.

  - Accuracy: preventing discrepancies between votes cast and re-

ported figures through robust verification mechanisms.

- Security: protecting the process from external interference, tampering, or fraudulent activities.

- **INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV):** IReV is an online platform introduced in 2020 by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to enhance transparency in election result management. It allows real-time uploading of polling unit results, providing stakeholders with immediate access to electoral data.

> *The data used for this study was sourced mainly from the IREV portal. 97% of the 8377 results uploaded on the IREV portal were analysed for this study. For Edo State, we examined 4358 polling unit results, and for Ondo State, 3796 results were examined.*

- **Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS):** The Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) is an electoral technology deployed by INEC to verify voter identity through fingerprint and facial recognition. It replaced the Smart Card Reader (SCR) to enhance voter authentication and to reduce fraudulent practices such as multiple voting. Functions of BVAS include:

  - **Biometric voter verification:** ensuring that only registered voters participate in the election.

  - **Real-time result transmission to IReV**: Although primarily

used for voter accreditation, BVAS also facilitates digital result uploads to IReV.

- **Form EC8 Series:** Form EC8 refers to a series of election result sheets used at different stages of result collation. These forms are critical in tracking votes from polling units to the final declaration of results.

  - **Form EC8A:** This form is Used at the polling unit level to record results immediately after voting and counting. It is the primary document uploaded to IReV.

  - **Form EC8B:** This form compiles results from multiple polling units at the registration area (ward) collation centre.

  - **Form EC8C:** This form aggregates ward-level results at the LGA collation centre.

  - **Form EC8D:** This form is used at the state collation centre for governorship elections, consolidating results from all LGAs.

  - **Form EC8E:** This form is used for presidential elections at the national collation centre.

    - **Overvoting:** Overvoting occurs when the total number of votes cast in an election exceeds the number of accredited voters at a polling unit. This anomaly suggests potential fraud, such as ballot stuffing or result inflation. According to section 40 of the INEC regulations and guidelines 2022, any polling unit where overvoting is detected must have its results annulled.

    - **Missing Ballots:** Missing ballots refer to discrepancies where the number of accredited voters is greater than the total votes cast. This suggests that some ballots were either lost, destroyed because of invalidation or incorrect voting, or deliberately excluded from the final collation. Missing ballot is the direct opposite of overvoting, and it also raises questions about the issue of voter mismatch at the polling units.

    - **Arithmetic Errors in Vote Tabulation:** Arithmetic errors refer to

mistakes in the summation of votes at polling units or collation centres. These errors occur when the total number of votes assigned to candidates does not match the overall sum of valid votes. This also means that the calculation of votes accumulated by all the political parties, which was written on Form EC8A, is not equal to the number of valid votes written on the same form.

- **Registered Voter Mismatch:** A registered voter mismatch occurs when discrepancies exist between the number of registered voters reported before an election and figures recorded in the final election results. These are inconsistencies in the total number released by INEC before the election and the number announced after the elections.

- **Cluster Detection Analysis:** Cluster detection is a statistical technique used to identify patterns and anomalies in election results. By analysing vote distributions and turnout rates, election observers can detect irregularities that may indicate fraud. Cluster detection has been instrumental in identifying electoral malpractices in various countries and is a key tool in the Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) for evaluating the credibility of election results in Edo and Ondo.

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2.4 Overview of the Methodological Approach

The Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) employs a statistical and quantitative research approach to assess electoral integrity. The methodology focuses on identifying anomalies, trends, and potential irregularities in vote share distributions and result transmission.

The following analytical techniques are applied:

- **Descriptive Statistical Analysis**: Examining turnout distribution and vote share patterns to detect irregular trends.

- **Cluster Detection Analysis**: Using two-dimensional histograms to visualise vote share distributions and pinpoint irregular concentrations of votes that may indicate electoral manipulation.

- **Cumulative Vote Analysis (CVA)**: Evaluating voting patterns over time and across polling units to identify abnormal fluctuations in turnout rates and vote margins.

- **Benford's Law Analysis**: Detecting unnatural patterns in vote counts, as genuine election results tend to follow predictable statistical distributions. Deviations from these patterns may suggest potential fraud or data manipulation.

2.5 Data Collection Methods and Sources

- **Primary Data Source:** The INEC Result Viewing (IReV) Portal

- **Data Extraction Process:**

  - **Edo State**: We analysed 4,358 polling unit results from the September 21, 2024, election.

  - **Ondo State**: We examined 3,796 polling unit results from the November 16, 2024, election.

- The dataset represents 97% of all results uploaded to IReV within the first week after each election:
    - Edo (data extracted between September 22-28, 2024)
    - Ondo (data extracted between November 17-24, 2024)

2.6 Research Scope

- **Primary Data Source:** The INEC Result Viewing (IReV) Portal
- **Data Extraction Process:**
    - **Edo State**: We analysed 4,358 polling unit results from the September 21, 2024, election.
    - **Ondo State**: We examined 3,796 polling unit results from the November 16, 2024, election.

2.7 Limitations of the Study

- All data analysed is sourced from the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), and the study assumes that the data available on the IReV accurately reflects the ground reality because trained INEC officials uploaded them.
- The analysis is based on a specific timeframe—a week after the 21st of September 2024 and 16th of November 2024 off-cycle governorship elections in Edo and Ondo states, respectively. The study did not reflect any changes or updates to the data after this period on IReV.
- The study did not capture all the nuances of the accreditation process, such as limitations in BVAS technology or operational challenges at specific polling units.

03.

Key Findings

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Highlights of the Study's Key Findings.

1. **Registered Voters' Mismatch: A Hidden Discrepancy**

   a. **Polling Unit-Level Inconsistencies:** In 141 polling units across Edo and 87 polling units in Ondo, the number of registered voters on Form EC8A did not match INEC's official pre-election figures.

   b. **These disparities are still at the state collation level:**

      ○ **Edo State:** The final registered voter count at the state collation centre was 18,340 voters fewer than the pre-election figure released by INEC.

      ○ **Ondo State:** A discrepancy of 1,926 voters was recorded at the state collation centre.

2. **Registered Voter Mismatch (2020 vs 2024 Trends):** Ondo State showed major improvement, reducing cases of registered voter mismatches from 148 in 2020 to 87 in 2024—a 41% drop while Edo State saw a much smaller improvement, with mismatches dropping only by 7.2% over the same period.

3. **Arithmetic Errors: A Tale of Two States:** Edo State saw a shocking surge in arithmetic errors, jumping from 150 cases in 2020 to 426 in 2024—a staggering 184% increase while Ondo State, on the other hand, improved significantly, reducing arithmetic errors by 69%.

4. **Mismatch between accredited voters and total- A Troubling Gap:** The study uncovered massive discrepancies in missing ballots—instances where the number of accredited voters was greater than the total votes cast. In Ondo State, 12,932 ballots missing and in Edo State: 29,053 ballots missing.

5. **At the state Collation-Level, collation level, Findings**: Edo still had 20,167 missing ballots after the final collation. And Ondo recorded 1,899 missing ballots at the collation stage. The contrast is stark: Missing ballots were over ten times higher in Edo than in Ondo.

6. **Missing Ballots (2020 vs. 2024 Comparison):** Ondo significantly improved

ballot accountability, cutting missing ballots by 70% between 2020 and 2024. However, Edo saw a troubling 131% increase, raising serious concerns about election administration and result integrity.

7. **Overvoting- Inflated Numbers in Polling Units:** Edo State recorded overvoting based on data on IReV in 382 polling units, and in Ondo State-183 polling units had excess votes. The total number of excess votes in Edo was seen as 8,88,7 and 4.045 votes in Ondo State. However, at the state collation level, overvoting disappeared, suggesting that figures may have been reconciled at the ward or LGA level before reaching the final tally.

8. **IReV vs State Collation Reports - The Gaps in Edo**: IReV showed 22 instances of Form EC40G uploads across 11 LGAs, indicating that elections did not hold or were cancelled in several polling units. At the state collation centre, only 3 LGA collation officers acknowledged these cancelled elections, leaving 8 LGAs unaccounted for in official statements.

9. **IReV vs State Collation Reports-** The Ondo Story: IReV recorded at least 19 Form EC40G uploads across 7 LGAs, confirming cancelled or non-conducted elections in specific polling units. However, state collation reports failed to reflect this reality, with only Okitipupa LGA acknowledging election annulments due to overvoting.

Registered Voters' Mismatch: Discrepancies in Official Figures

One of the key findings of this study is the existence of discrepancies between the number of registered voters recorded on **Form EC8A** at some polling units and the figures released by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) before the election. This inconsistency raises important questions about the accuracy of voter registration records and the integrity of the electoral process.

According to INEC's electoral timeline, the Commission releases a detailed breakdown of registered voters by polling unit, local government area (LGA), and the entire voting constituency ahead of the elections[14] [15]. These figures are usually finalized within two weeks to the election date, after the conclusion of the Permanent Voter Card (PVC) collection process. During election reporting, presiding officers at each polling unit document voter turnout and related statistics in Form EC8A, which serves as the official summary of the voting process at that level.

However, analysis by Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) revealed instances where the number of registered voters recorded in Form EC8A did not align with the official pre-election data released by INEC. In Edo State, discrepancies were identified in various locations, including Enwan/Atte/Ikpeshi/Egbibele Registration Area (RA) in Akoko-Edo LGA and Ogida/Use RA in Egor LGA. Similarly, in Ondo State, mismatches were found in polling units located in Oke Aro/Uro II RA in Akure South LGA and Iluabo/Eleyewo/Bolorunduro RA in Akure North LGA.

| 167 | EDO | AKOKO EDO | ENWAN/ATTE/IKPESHI/EGBIGELE | ATTE, MATERNITY CENTRE | 12-01-08-008 | 750 | 750 | 0 | 100.0 |
| 361 | EDO | EGOR | OGIDA/USE | USEH SECONDARY SCHOOL | 12-02-03-047 | 380 | 380 | 0 | 100.0 |

Fig 1 – 2: Left, INEC announced 750, while the form recorded an increased number of 754, while on the right, INEC announced 380, while the form recorded an increased number of 400

| 167 | EDO | AKOKO EDO | ENWAN/ATTE/IKPESHI/EGBIGELE | ATTE, MATERNITY CENTRE | 12-01-08-008 | 750 | 750 | 0 | 100.0 |
| 361 | EDO | EGOR | OGIDA/USE | USEH SECONDARY SCHOOL | 12-02-03-047 | 380 | 380 | 0 | 100.0 |

Fig 3 – 4: INEC announced 186, while the form recorded a decreased number of 185. On the right, INEC announced 1,791, while the form recorded an increased number of 1,971

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A broader analysis of polling unit-level data from the INEC Result Viewing (IReV) Portal and official voter registration records indicated that this issue was observed in 141 out of 4,519 polling units in Edo State and 87 out of 3,933 polling units in Ondo State. While these figures may appear relatively small compared to the total number of polling units, their presence across multiple locations suggests the need for further examination of election data management and collation processes.

Number of Polling Units where Registered Voters Mismatched

141 — Edo State

87 — Ondo State

This challenge is also highlighted in the pervasive spread of these incidents, which took place at least once in all 18 Edo local government areas and in 16 of Ondo's 18 local government areas. The highest recorded incidents in Edo were in Etsako West (29), Ikpoba/Okha (23) and Oredo (15), with the latter two being among the LGAs with the most registered voters. As successful governors-elect need to receive a quarter of the vote in two-thirds of the LGAs in a state, compromising a candidate's ability to achieve the spread can question how true the process has been.

Number of LGAs where Registered Voters Mismatched-EDO

LGA	Value
AKOKO EDO	5
EGOR	12
ESAN CENTRAL	2
ESAN NORTH EAST	2
ESAN SOUTH EAST	9
ESAN WEST	6
ETSAKO WEST	29
ETSAKO CENTRAL	1
ETSAKO EAST	5
IGUEBEN	2
IKPOBA/OKHA	23
OREDO	15
ORHONMWON	8
OVIA NORTH EAST	7
OVIA SOUTH WEST	5
OWAN EAST	1
OWAN WEST	3
UHUNMWODE	6

Number of LGAs where Registered Voters Mismatched-ONDO

LGA	Value
AKOKO NORTH WEST	2
AKOKO SOUTH EAST	2
AKOKO SOUTH WEST	1
AKURE NORTH	1
AKURE SOUTH	22
ESE-ODO	3
IFEDORE	1
ILAJE	12
ILEOLUJI/OKBGBO	5
IRELE	7
ODIGBO	7
OKITIPUPA	5
ONDO EAST	3
ONDO WEST	5
OSE	2
OWO	9

Registered Voters' Mismatch at the State Collation Level

Beyond polling unit discrepancies, this analysis also examined voter registration figures at the State Collation Centres, where results from all LGAs were aggregated and officially declared. The study found that the mismatch in registered voter figures persisted even at this critical stage of collation.

In Edo State, the total number of registered voters declared at the State Collation Centre was 18,340 fewer than the official pre-election figure provided by INEC. Specifically, the voter registration data in Esan North East, Etsako Central, Etsako East, Ikpoba/Okha, Oredo, Orhionmwon, Ovia South West, Owan East, Owan West, and Uhunmwode LGAs showed notable differences between the figures recorded before the election and those announced at the collation centre.

Table 1: Registered Voters Mismatched Observed at the State Collation Centres- EDO

LGA	Registered Voters Before Election (INEC)	Registered Voters Declared at State Collation Centres	Difference	Mismatch (Yes/No)
AKOKO EDO	144,379	144,379	0	No
EGOR	242,266	242,266	0	No
ESAN CENTRAL	68,338	68,338	0	No
ESAN NORTH EAST	102,280	106,280	4,000	Yes
ESAN SOUTH EAST	90,240	90,240	0	No
ESAN WEST	113,067	113,067	0	No

ETSAKO WEST	186,449	186,449	0	No
ETSAKO CENTRAL	59,984	59,430	–554	Yes
ETSAKO EAST	102,454	102,754	300	Yes
IGUEBEN	54,549	54,549	0	No
IKPOBA/OKHA	400,494	392,782	–7,712	Yes
OREDO	357,371	356,242	–1,129	Yes
ORHIONMWON	140,715	139,260	–1,455	Yes
OVIA NORTH EAST	177,106	177,106	0	No
OVIA SOUTH WEST	113,924	112,091	–1,833	Yes
OWAN EAST	106,796	106,252	–544	Yes
OWAN WEST	73,732	67,076	–6,656	Yes
UHUNMWODE	94,926	92,169	–2,757	Yes
TOTAL	**2,629,070**	**2,610,730**	**–18,340**	**Yes**

Similarly, in Ondo State, a discrepancy of 1,926 registered voters was observed at the State Collation Centre. While the variation was not as substantial as in Edo, inconsistencies were noted in LGAs such as Akoko South West, Akure North, Ilaje, Ileoluji/Okeigbo, and Ondo East. Some LGAs, like Akoko North West, recorded marginal differences, while others maintained full alignment between pre-election and post-election voter registration figures.

Table 2: Registered Voters Mismatched Observed at the State Collation Center- ONDO

LGA	Registered Voters Before Election (INEC)	Registered Voters Declared at State Collation Centres	Difference	Mismatch (Yes/No)
AKOKO NORTH EAST	93,285	93,285	0	No
AKOKO NORTH WEST	84,901	84,908	7	Yes
AKOKO SOUTH EAST	41,978	41,978	0	No
AKOKO SOUTH WEST	112,027	116,368	4,341	Yes
AKURE NORTH	87,593	87,293	-300	Yes
AKURE SOUTH	314,709	314,709	0	No
ESE-ODO	84,888	84,888	0	No
IDANRE	91,392	91,392	0	No
IFEDORE	83,831	83,831	0	No
ILAJE	147,209	146,146	-1,063	Yes
ILEOLUJI/ OKEIGBO	81,964	81,954	-10	Yes
IRELE	78,982	78,982	0	No
ODIGBO	154,382	154,382	0	No
OKITIPUPA	126,021	126,021	0	No
ONDO EAST	57,175	52,274	-4,901	Yes
ONDO WEST	190,666	190,666	0	No

OSE	78,307	78,307	0	No
OWO	143,751	143,751	0	No
TOTAL	**2,053,061**	**2,051,135**	**−1,926**	**Yes**

To provide historical context, this study compared the frequency of registered voter mismatches recorded in the 2020 and 2024 elections. The findings indicate significant improvement in Ondo State, where the number of reported cases decreased from 148 in 2020 to 87 in 2024, representing a 41% reduction. However, in Edo State, the decline was less pronounced, with mismatches dropping from 152 in 2020 to 141 in 2024, reflecting only a 7.2% reduction.

Comparison of the frequency of registered voters' mismatch in 2020 and 2024

152 — 141 — 148 — 87

Edo State — Ondo State

■ 2020 ■ 2024

Ondo experienced the sharpest decline, from 148 cases in 2020 to 87 cases in 2024—a 41% drop, while Edo dropped only with a 7.2% reduction.

Assessing the Integrity of the Ballot: The 2024 Edo and Ondo Governorship Elections.

While the decline in mismatches suggests some improvements in data reconciliation and election administration, the persistence of these discrepancies underscores the need for continuous refinement of electoral processes. Ensuring accuracy in voter registration records and maintaining consistency between pre-election and election-day data are fundamental to fostering public trust in the electoral system.

These findings highlight areas for further investigation and engagement with relevant stakeholders, particularly in refining voter registration processes, strengthening collation procedures, and enhancing the overall transparency of the electoral process.

Key Finding **3**

Arithmetic Errors in Vote Calculation: A Comparative Analysis of Edo and Ondo States

Nigeria's electoral process, which is still collated manually, continues to be affected by human error when carrying out arithmetic calculations. These incidents are logged when the total vote share by political parties, as submitted on the EC8A form, does not correspond or correlate with the number of valid votes written on the same document.

Arithmetic errors in election results refer to discrepancies in calculations made by polling officers, particularly where the sum of votes allocated to political parties does not match the total number of valid votes recorded on Form EC8A. These errors, while sometimes unintentional, can raise concerns about the accuracy of results and the overall efficiency of the collation process. The occurrence of such inconsistencies varies across different elections, as seen in the analysis of arithmetic errors in the 2024 Edo and Ondo State elections compared to the 2020 elections.

This is because the total vote share is meant to correspond to the total number of valid votes. Similarly, the total number of valid, spoilt and rejected votes, should add up to the total number of used ballots and accredited votes. When there is a discrepancy, the authenticity of the result is called into question, as seen in the examples below.

Form EC8A in Edo 2024 elections from Ikpoba/Okha and Etsako West

In Figure 10 above, the total number of valid votes recorded was 111, while the total number of votes recorded by the parties was 98. Even including the three rejected votes recorded would only amount to 101 votes, leading to questions about which of the numbers reported is wrong. In Figure 11, the total number of votes cast, and the valid votes are recorded as 142, but an actual summation of the numbers allocated to each party shows that the total is actually 147. Such reporting could be easily missed since the other details track and add up.

Form EC8A in Ondo 2024 elections from Ese-Odo and Idanre

Similarly, in these examples from the Ondo election, there are discrepancies recorded. In Figure 12, the number of votes received by the parties adds up to 176, but 183 is the total number of votes reported for the polling unit. In Figure 13, the votes received by the four parties add up to 165, but 173 is reported as the total valid votes and recorded in the summary section. While there is no clear example that this action disproportionately advantaged any party, there are examples that human error can affect the outcome.

Number of Polling Units where Arithmetic errors occured

426 — Edo State
44 — Ondo State

Assessing the Integrity of the Ballot: The 2024 Edo and Ondo Governorship Elections.

Comparison of the frequency of arithmetic errors in 2020 and 2024

Arithmetic errors in Edo State surged from 150 in 2020 to 426 in 2024—a 184% increase. In contrast, Ondo State saw a decline—a 69% reduction.

While Ondo significantly improved in reducing errors, Edo witnessed a threefold increase, suggesting that election administration and result collation quality varied greatly between the two states.

In Edo State, the frequency of arithmetic errors increased substantially in the 2024 election compared to 2020. In the 2020 election, 150 polling units recorded arithmetic errors, whereas in 2024, this number rose sharply to 426 polling units. This represents a 184% increase, indicating a significant rise in calculation inconsistencies across polling stations. The surge in arithmetic errors suggests that there may have been challenges in accurately summing up votes at the polling unit level, potentially due to human errors in tabulating results or the pressure on election officials during result collation.

Conversely, Ondo State demonstrated a notable improvement in minimizing arithmetic errors. In the 2020 election, arithmetic errors were observed in 142 polling units, whereas in 2024, the number dropped significantly to 44 polling units. This decline represents a 69% reduction, indicating a marked improvement in the accuracy of result collation in the state. The reduction in errors may reflect enhanced training of polling officials, better oversight mechanisms, or increased familiarity with result collation processes.

The contrast between the two states underscores the variations in election administration and resul fromt collation practices. While Ondo State showed progress in reducing errors, Edo State experienced a significant increase, highlighting the need for a closer examination of election administration

processes in different regions. Factors such as the level of training provided to polling officers, the complexity of the collation process, and the level of scrutiny applied to result verification could all contribute to these differences.

Addressing arithmetic errors is critical for maintaining electoral integrity and public confidence in the election process. While minor discrepancies may not always affect the overall outcome of an election, their presence can contribute to concerns about transparency and efficiency. Moving forward, continued efforts in capacity building for election officials, strengthened verification processes, and the adoption of digital tools for real-time collation and verification could help mitigate such errors and enhance the credibility of the electoral process.

Assessing the Integrity of the Ballot: The 2024 Edo and Ondo Governorship Elections.

Unaccounted or Missing Ballot in the 2024 Edo and Ondo Elections: A Detailed Analysis

Missing ballots refer to instances where the number of accredited voters recorded during an election exceeds the total number of votes cast. According to the INEC guidelines, the principle of voting requires continuous accreditation and voting. This means that once a voter is accredited, they should immediately receive a ballot paper and cast their vote. Therefore, a situation where accredited voters outnumber total votes cast suggests that some individuals were accredited and received ballot papers, but their votes were not accounted for in the final tally.

Form EC8A in Edo 2024 elections from Igueben and Oredo showing discrepancies in Accredited voters and Votes Cast

In Figure 15, despite the total valid votes cast being recorded as 174, there were 179 accredited voters in this polling unit. A similar occurrence was observed Oredo, where despite 96 valid votes being counted, there were 100 accredited voters in the polling unit. In the Akoko South-West polling unit in Figure 17, the difference between the valid votes and accredited voters was 16, and it was 12 in the Irele polling unit in Figure 18. These examples also show the number of ballot papers issued to match expected voter counts.

Form EC8A in Ondo 2024 elections from Akoko South West and Irele showing discrepancies in Accredited voters and Votes Cast

In the 2024 elections, missing ballots were observed in both Edo and Ondo States, although the extent varied significantly. The total number of missing ballots recorded in Edo State was **29,053**, while in Ondo State, **12,931** ballots were unaccounted for. This analysis was conducted up to the state collation level, confirming that even at the final collation stage, a substantial number of votes remained missing.

Ondo State 12,931

Edo State 29,053

The sum of unaccounted ballots where accredited voters were greater than total vote cast

Extent of Missing Ballots at the State Collation Centre

At the state collation center, where the final election results were declared by INEC, a large number of missing ballots persisted. In Edo State, 20,167 ballots remained unaccounted for, a considerably high figure compared to 1,899 ballots in Ondo State.

The breakdown of missing ballots across Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Edo State reveals significant variations. While some LGAs recorded relatively small discrepancies, others had notably high numbers of missing ballots. For instance, Ikpoba/Okha LGA had the highest number of missing ballots, with 11,198 votes unaccounted for. Similarly, Etsako East recorded 3,723 missing ballots, while Oredo LGA had 760 missing votes. These large gaps indicate challenges in result collation and ballot accountability.

*Table featuring accredited voters, total votes cast and missing ballots in Edo and Ondo 2024 governorship election*s

LGA	ACCREDITED VOTERS	TOTAL VOTE CAST (INEC)	MISSING BALLOT
AKOKO EDO	54,395	53,878	517
EGOR	35,463	35,040	423
ESAN CENTRAL	20,580	20,559	21
ESAN NORTH EAST	24,430	24,311	119
ESAN SOUTH EAST	23,390	23,136	254
ESAN WEST	25,702	25,384	318
ETSAKO WEST	54,304	53,414	890
ETSAKO CENTRAL	21,465	21,145	320
ETSAKO EAST	35,084	31,361	3,723
IGUEBEN	15,274	15,267	7
IKPOBA/OKHA	61,437	50,239	11,198
OREDO	64,802	64,042	760
ORHIONMWON	33,196	32,650	546
OVIA NORTH EAST	32,441	32,095	346
OVIA SOUTH WEST	23,196	22,796	400
OWAN EAST	34,618	34,577	41
OWAN WEST	24,311	24,295	16
UHUNMWODE	20,044	19,776	268
Total	**604,132**	**583,965**	**20,167**

In contrast, Ondo State had a lower incidence of missing ballots, with cases spread across different LGAs. Idanre LGA recorded the highest number of missing ballots, with 534 votes unaccounted for, while Okitipupa followed with 359 missing votes. Although these figures are lower compared to Edo State, they still highlight instances of discrepancies in ballot reconciliation.

LGA	ACCREDITED VOTERS (INEC)	TOTAL VOTES CAST	Missing Ballot
AKOKO NORTH EAST	31,734	31,697	37
AKOKO NORTH WEST	31,263	31,114	149
AKOKO SOUTH EAST	15,150	15,148	2
AKOKO SOUTH WEST	36,300	36,225	75
AKURE NORTH	21,608	21,590	18
AKURE SOUTH	54,670	54,642	28
ESE-ODO	22,975	22,968	7
IDANRE	19,712	19,178	534
IFEDORE	21,024	20,998	26
ILAJE	29,131	28,885	246
ILEOLUJI/OKEIGBO	22,256	21,995	261
IRELE	24,772	24,749	23
ODIGBO	38,163	38,161	2
OKITIPUPA	38,814	38,455	359
ONDO EAST	11,864	11,852	12
ONDO WEST	31,418	31,382	36
OSE	21,661	21,607	54
OWO	38,347	38,317	30
Total	**510,862**	**508,963**	**1,899**

Comparing 2020 and 2024 Elections: Trends in Missing Ballots

A comparative analysis of the 2020 and 2024 elections shows a stark difference in how Edo and Ondo States managed ballot accountability over time. In Edo State, missing ballots increased sharply from 7,201 in 2020 to 20,167 in 2024, representing a 131% surge. This trend suggests deeper challenges in election administration and result from collation in the state, raising concerns about the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms.

Comparison of unaccounted ballots (2020 and 2024)

20,167

7,201

4,020

1,899

Edo State   Ondo State

■ 2020 ■ 2024

Ondo State made remarkable improvements in ballot accountability, reducing unaccounted ballots by 70%, while Edo State witnessed a troubling 131% surge, signalling deeper challenges in election administration and result integrity.

On the other hand, Ondo State made significant progress in reducing missing ballots, with figures dropping from 4,020 in 2020 to 1,899 in 2024, marking a 70% improvement. This decline indicates that election management practices in the state have improved, potentially due to enhanced ballot tracking, better-trained officials, or stricter adherence to electoral procedures.

The sharp increase in missing ballots in Edo State raises questions about the efficiency of election administration and the reliability of the collation process. Missing ballots can undermine public confidence in the electoral process, particularly if they are concentrated in specific areas. Given the scale of the issue, there is a need for a comprehensive review of result collation procedures in Edo State to identify the root causes of these discrepancies and implement corrective measures.

Meanwhile, Ondo State's significant reduction in missing ballots is commendable. The state's improved performance suggests that specific administrative measures were effective in minimizing vote discrepancies. These best practices should be studied and potentially replicated in other regions to enhance ballot accountability nationwide.

Addressing missing ballots requires a multi-faceted approach, including improved training for election officials, enhanced result verification mechanisms, and stronger oversight at the collation stage. By adopting these measures, election management bodies can ensure greater transparency, accuracy, and public trust in the electoral process.

Assessing the Integrity of the Ballot: The 2024 Edo and Ondo Governorship Elections.

A detailed Examination of Overvoting seen on Results obtained from IReV

Overvoting occurs when the total number of votes cast in a polling unit exceeds the number of accredited voters recorded by the Electoral Commission. According to the **Electoral Act 2022**, specifically **Section 51(2)**, "Where the number of votes cast at an election in any polling unit exceeds the number of accredited voters in that polling unit, the result of the election for that polling unit shall be declared null and void, and the election shall be cancelled in that polling unit." This legal provision underscores the severity of overvoting, as it mandates the cancellation of results in affected polling units to ensure electoral integrity.

In the 2024 governorship elections, overvoting was identified in both Edo and Ondo States, although the frequency varied significantly between the two. In Edo State, overvoting was recorded in 381 polling units, while in Ondo State, it was observed in 183 polling units. This suggests a higher incidence of overvoting in Edo compared to Ondo. Beyond just the number of polling units affected, the extent of excess votes was also examined. In Edo State, 8,887 votes were identified as the total number of accredited voters. Similarly, in Ondo State, a total of 4,045 accredited voters were recorded.

The number of polling units where accredited voters were lesser than total votes cast

381 — Edo State

183 — Ondo State

| Ondo State | **4,045** | **The sum of excess votes where accredited voters were lesser than total votes cast** |
| Edo State | **8,887** | |

Given that overvoting results in the cancellation of votes in affected polling units, it was crucial to analyze the total number of valid votes from these polling units before they were cancelled. In Edo State, a total of 59,903 valid votes were recorded in the polling units affected by overvoting. The breakdown of these votes among political parties showed that:

- The All Progressives Congress (APC) secured 30,352 votes.
- The People's Democratic Party (PDP) obtained 5,488 votes.
- Other parties collectively received 2,358 votes.

For Ondo State, the total number of valid votes in polling units where overvoting occurred was 25,424 votes. The distribution was as follows:

- The APC had 17,578 votes.
- The PDP secured 5,488 votes.
- Other parties obtained 2,358 votes.

59,903

Total number of valid votes from the PU with overvoting in Edo State.

OTHERS 2,358
PDP 5,488
APC 30,352

25,424

Total number of valid votes from the PU with overvoting in Ondo State.

OTHERS
2,358

PDP
5,488

APC
17,578

A critical question that arises from this analysis is whether the scale of overvoting was significant enough to alter the outcome of the election.

Could Overvoting Have Influenced the Election Results? The margin of victory between the winner and the first runner-up provides insight into whether the votes from the affected polling units could have changed the overall election outcome. In Edo State, the margin of victory, as declared by INEC, was 44,393 votes. The APC candidate, Monday Okpebholo, won the election with 291,667 votes, while the PDP candidate, Asue Ighodalo, secured 247,274 votes. If all the 59,903 votes from the affected polling units were to be removed from the total count based on the proportion per candidate, it would still not affect the resulting trajectory – it would only reduce further the margin of lead, which is of greater importance when we consider where Election did not hold. In Ondo State, the situation was quite different. The total number of valid votes from polling units with overvoting was 25,424, which is significantly lower than the margin of victory in the election. Given that the winner's lead exceeded this number, the cancellation of these votes would not have altered the final result in any meaningful way.

To further assess the impact of overvoting, the figures were traced through the collation process up to the state collation level. Interestingly, no cases of overvoting were detected at the state collation level in either Edo or Ondo States. This suggests that the collation officers at the ward and local government levels may have reconciled the figures before submitting

the final results at the state collation renter. While this could indicate that appropriate measures were taken to rectify errors before reaching the final stage, it also highlights the importance of transparency and consistency in the collation process. Ensuring that figures align accurately from the polling unit level up to the state level remains critical for maintaining public trust in the electoral process.

The occurrence of overvoting in the 2024 Edo and Ondo governorship elections highlights important electoral management challenges. While Ondo State had fewer instances of overvoting and a lower number of excess votes, Edo State recorded a higher frequency of overvoting and a larger volume of excess ballots. In Edo, the scale of overvoting raises concerns about election administration at the polling unit level. Given that overvoting leads to the cancellation of votes, it is crucial to ensure that electoral officials strictly adhere to accreditation and voting procedures to prevent such discrepancies.

Moving forward, the following steps could help strengthen election integrity:

1. **Improved Voter Accreditation Systems** – Ensuring that only accredited voters cast ballots through enhanced biometric verification could reduce the risk of overvoting.
2. **Stricter Polling Unit-Level Oversight** – Deploying more election observers and party agents to closely monitor voting and result compilation at polling units.
3. **Enhanced Reconciliation Processes** – Strengthening the collation process at the ward and local government levels to ensure figures remain accurate before they reach the state collation centre.

Discrepancy Between IReV and State Collation Centre Reports in Ondo and Edo Elections

An analysis of the electoral process in Ondo and Edo states has revealed notable discrepancies between the figures recorded on the Independent National Electoral Commission's (INEC) Election Result Viewing (IReV) portal and those officially declared at the state collation centres. These variations raise important questions about the transparency of the collation process, particularly concerning unreported election cancellations and disparities in vote counts at different stages of collation.

Unreported Election Cancellations in Ondo State

In Ondo State, at least 19 instances of Form EC40G uploads were identified across seven Local Government Areas (LGAs), indicating that elections did not hold or were cancelled in specific polling units. However, at the official collation stage, LGA Returning Officers did not report any cancellations, except in Okitipupa LGA, where an election result was annulled due to overvoting.

The LGAs where cancellations were identified on IReV but not reflected in the collation reports include:
- Akoko North West (1 polling unit)
- Akoko South West (1 polling unit)
- Akure North (1 polling unit)
- Ese-Odo (3 polling units)
- Ileoluji/Okeigbo (2 polling units)
- Ilaje (4 polling units)
- Idanre (7 polling units)

This discrepancy suggests that some election results may have been omitted from official reports, raising concerns about whether cancellations were appropriately accounted for at the LGA and state collation levels.

EC40G forms from polling units in Owan East, Esan North East (Edo), Akure North, and Ile-Oluji/Oke Igbo (Ondo) show poll cancellations. All LGA officers did not acknowledge them in their official submissions to the state collation centre.

Discrepancies in Edo State Election Reports

A similar pattern was observed in Edo State, where IReV recorded at least 22 instances of Form EC40G uploads across 11 LGAs, signaling that elections were either not conducted or were canceled in those polling units. However, at the state collation centre, only three LGA collation officers—representing Akoko Edo, Etsako Central, and Ikpoba Okha—acknowledged that elections were disrupted. This left eight LGAs unaccounted for in the official collation process.

The LGAs where election cancellations were identified on IReV but not mentioned in the collation reports include:

- Owan East
- Esan North East
- Ovia South West
- Ovia North East
- Uhunmwonde
- Egor
- Esan West
- Orhionmwon

The lack of official acknowledgment of these cancellations raises questions about the reconciliation process at the ward and LGA collation levels. This suggests that adjustments may have been made before the results reached the state collation centre, potentially impacting the final vote tally.

Comparing IReV and INEC-Declared Results

Further analysis was conducted to compare the LGAs won by each political party based on IReV collation with those officially declared by INEC. While most LGAs showed consistency in results, a few disparities emerged.

LGA	LGA Won on IReV	LGA Won as Declared by INEC
Akoko Edo	APC	APC
Egor	PDP	APC
Esan Central	APC	APC
Esan North East	PDP	PDP
Esan South East	PDP	PDP
Esan West	APC	APC
Etsako West	APC	APC
Etsako Central	APC	APC
Etsako East	APC	APC
Igueben	PDP	PDP
Ikpoba/Okha	PDP	PDP
Oredo	PDP	APC
Orhionmwon	APC	APC
Ovia North East	PDP	PDP
Ovia South West	APC	PDP
Owan East	APC	APC
Owan West	APC	APC
Uhunmwode	PDP	PDP

This table highlights instances where the party declared victorious by INEC at the LGA level differed from the results collated on IReV, particularly in Egor, Oredo, and Ovia South West.

Disparities in Vote Counts

A detailed review of the vote tallies for the two leading parties (APC and PDP) further highlights variations between what was recorded on IReV and what was officially declared by INEC.

LGA	Figures Declared by INEC - APC	Figures Collated on IReV - APC	Difference (APC)	Figures Declared by INEC - PDP	Figures Collated on IReV - PDP	Difference (PDP)
Akoko Edo	34,847	24,935	9,912	15,865	18,606	(2,741)
Egor	16,760	11,046	5,714	14,658	14,570	88
Esan Central	10,990	10,770	220	8,618	8,329	289
Esan North East	10,648	11,123	(475)	12,522	12,568	(46)
Esan South East	8,398	7,814	584	14,199	13,703	496
Esan West	12,952	12,806	146	11,004	11,191	(187)
Etsako West	32,107	30,152	1,955	17,483	17,092	391
Etsako Central	11,906	10,900	1,006	8,455	8,079	376
Etsako East	20,167	25,032		9,683	10,714	(1,031)
Igueben	5,907	5,762	145	8,470	8,084	386
Ikpoba/Okha	16,338	17,939	(1,601)	26,382	31,280	(4,898)
Oredo	30,780	17,387	13,393	24,938	29,161	(4,223)

Orhionmwon	16,059	16,083	(24)	14,614	14,515	99
Ovia North East	13,225	13,016	209	15,311	15,152	159
Ovia South West	10,150	10,188	(38)	10,260	10,089	171
Owan East	19,380	19,486	(106)	14,189	14,163	26
Owan West	12,277	12,555	(278)	11,284	11,374	(90)
Uhunmwode	8,776	9,024	(248)	9,339	9,284	55
TOTAL	**291,667**	**266,018**	**40,871**	**247,274**	**257,954**	**(10,680)**

This table highlights the differences between the votes declared by INEC and those recorded on the IReV platform for each LGA. Some key observations include:

1. In some LGAs, the votes for APC were inflated in the INEC-declared results compared to what was recorded on IReV, with notable cases in Akoko Edo (9,912 more votes for APC on INEC results) and Oredo (13,393 more votes for APC on INEC results).

2. For PDP, there were instances where the IReV figures showed more votes than INEC's declared results, such as in Ikpoba/Okha (4,898 more votes for PDP on IReV) and Oredo (4,223 more votes for PDP on IReV).

3. The overall vote count discrepancies between IReV and INEC results show that APC had 40,871 votes more in the INEC-declared results compared to IReV, while PDP had 10,680 fewer votes in the INEC-declared results compared to IReV.

This analysis raises important questions about the consistency of the election collation process. While the discrepancies do not change the overall outcome, as APC still emerged as the winner in both the INEC-declared and IReV-collated results, the margin of lead significantly differs.

The declared margin of lead by INEC was 44,393 votes, while the margin of lead based on IReV was significantly lower at 8,064 votes. Additionally, the number of polling units where Form EC40G was uploaded, indicating that

elections were either cancelled or did not hold, amounted to 22 polling units. The total registered voters in these affected polling units stood at 13,942, with 11,917 PVCs collected.

Given that the number of cancelled votes exceeds the margin of a lead according to the IReV figures, this situation suggests that the election could have met the conditions for a supplementary election under the electoral framework. However, the discrepancies observed between IReV and the final collation suggest that adjustments to voting figures may have contributed to avoiding a supplementary election. The variations, which is an indicative of malpractice (inflated figures), underscore the need for greater transparency and consistency in the collation process. Electoral data across different collation levels must remain consistent to uphold public confidence in the process.

A detailed review and reconciliation of these figures would provide further clarity on whether these discrepancies were due to administrative errors, data entry inconsistencies, or other factors affecting the collation process.

Unmasking Irregular Clusters: Detecting Election Anomalies through Statistical Patterns

Elections are complex processes, and while they are designed to reflect the will of the people, irregularities, whether due to fraud, coercion, or administrative inefficiencies can distort results. Political scientists and data analysts have developed various methods to detect such irregularities, including Benford's Law, digit-based fraud detection, vote flow analysis, turnout anomalies, and spatial autocorrelation techniques. Among these, cluster detection of vote share distribution has emerged as a powerful tool in unmasking electoral manipulation.

One of the most revealing ways to visualize voting patterns is by using two-dimensional histograms that plot voter turnout (x-axis) against the percentage of votes (y-axis) for the winning party. In a well-functioning electoral process, these clusters tend to follow a natural distribution, with most results concentrated around an expected range. However, in some cases, irregular clusters emerge, suggesting potential election manipulation.

For example, in Russia and Uganda, researchers have observed clusters that extend to the upper right of the graph, forming a second peak at 100% turnout and 100% vote share—a strong red flag for electoral fraud. By contrast, countries like Canada show distinct regional clustering (e.g., Québécois vs. English Canada), while Finland's data revealed smearing patterns indicative of voter mobilization around key political controversies.

Irregularities in Vote Share Distribution: Cluster Detection in Nigeria's Elections

Cluster Detection Analysis – 2020 Edo State

Cluster Detection Analysis – 2020 Ondo State

Similarly, in the 2024 Edo and Ondo state governorship elections, cluster detection analysis confirmed that the voting distribution remained consistent with expected democratic trends. Unlike Imo, Kogi, and Bayelsa states, we identified irregular clusters indicative of possible electoral manipulation. These states exhibited concentrated peaks at high turnout levels and near-total vote shares for one candidate, a hallmark of ballot stuffing, voter suppression, or coercion.

Cluster Detection Analysis – 2024 Edo State

Sum of %APC, sum of %PDP and sum of %LP vs. sum of % Voter Turnout (Pvc:Tvc). Details are shown for Polling Unit Id. The data is filtered on % Voter Turnout (Pvc:Tvc) and %APC. The % Voter Turnout (Pvc:Tvc) filter ranges from 0 to 1 and keeps Null values. The %APC filter ranges from 0 to 1 and keeps Null values. The view is filtered on sum of %LP and sum of %PDP. The sum of %LP filter keeps non-Null values only. The sum of %PDP filter keeps non-Null values only.

Cluster Detection Analysis – 2024 Ondo State

Sum of %APC and sum of %PDP vs. sum of % Voter Turnout (Pvc:Tvc). Details are shown for Polling Unit Id. The data is filtered on %APC and % Voter Turnout (Pvc:Tvc). The %APC filter ranges from 0 to 1. The % Voter Turnout (Pvc:Tvc) filter ranges from 0.010489510 to 1. The view is filtered on sum of %PDP, which ranges from 0.000 to 1.000.

Statistical Detection of Election Irregularities-IMO STATE

In the two-dimensional histograms of the number of units for a given voter turnout (x axis) and the percentage of votes (y axis) for the winning party (or candidate). The normal distribution are cluster around a given turnout and vote percentage level without a smear. But in the case of Imo governorship election – there is another cluster that smeared out to the upper corner of the plots, reaching a second peak at a 100% turnout and 100% of votes (red circles). Such as the case in Uganda and Russia (This is indicative of electoral irregularities). **WHY DO WE HAVE A SECOND PEAK AT 100% TURNOUT AND CLOSE TO 100% VOTE SHARED?**

NOTE: Turnout over 100% excluded/ nulls on % APC, %PDP AND %LP were excluded.

Statistical Detection of Election Irregularities- KOGI STATE

NOTE: Turnout over 100% excluded/ nulls on % APC, %PDP AND %SDP were excluded.

The presence or absence of irregular vote clusters has profound implications for electoral integrity we believe that cluster analysis can be integrated into early warning systems for election observers, allowing them to predict and investigate areas prone to irregularities before results are officially declared.

04.

Lessons from the 2024 Edo and Ondo Ballot Integrity Project and Global Best Practices in Election Result Management

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Election integrity is fundamental to democracy, ensuring that results reflect the will of the people. Nigeria has made significant strides in electoral reform, including the introduction of biometric voter registration (BVAS) and the INEC Results Viewing Portal (IReV). However, persistent challenges, which have been exhaustively discussed in previous chapters, emphasise the need for further refinement. For instance, findings from the 2020 and 2024 Edo and Ondo governorship elections, compared to those of Imo, Kogi, and Bayelsa, highlight both positive trends and areas of concern in Nigeria's electoral process.

While there are no perfect electoral processes, several global models demonstrate effective practices in election result management. By drawing on global best practices in election result management, Nigeria can strengthen its electoral system, enhance transparency, and build public trust.

Key Lessons from Nigeria's Elections

1. **Disparities in Result Collation Undermine Credibility**
   - The mismatch between the INEC declared results and IReV uploads in Edo raises concerns about the collation process. While these disparities do not always indicate fraud, they create perception issues that can erode trust in the electoral system.
   - **Lesson:** Full harmonization between electronic and manual collation processes is crucial to prevent discrepancies that fuel post-election disputes.

2. **Unreported Election Cancellations Raise Transparency Concerns**
   - The existence of EC40G uploads (election cancellations) in Edo and Ondo without official acknowledgement from LGA Returning Officers suggests gaps in reporting procedures. This discrepancy may indicate either oversights, administrative inefficiencies, or deliberate suppression of information.
   - **Lesson:** A more accountable and transparent cancellation reporting system must be established, where all cancelled votes

are publicly accounted for in collation centres.

3. **Cluster Detection Reveals Electoral Manipulation in Some States**
   - Unlike Imo, Kogi, and Bayelsa—where irregular vote clusters suggest possible ballot stuffing or coerced voting—Edo and Ondo followed natural democratic patterns with no extreme peaks at 100% turnout or 100% vote share.
   - **Lesson:** The adoption of real-time anomaly detection systems—including machine-learning models used in advanced democracies—can help identify and address irregular voting patterns before results are officially announced.

Global Best Practices in Election Result Management: Lessons for Nigeria

To improve election transparency and credibility, Nigeria can learn from international standards in election result management:

1. **Real-Time Anomaly Detection and Cluster Analysis (USA, UK, Switzerland)**
   - o **Best Practice:** Advanced democracies use real-time data analysis to detect statistical anomalies in vote distribution, helping to identify fraudulent clusters early.
   - o **Lesson for Nigeria**: INEC should integrate AI-driven cluster detection tools that can flag irregularities before collation is finalized.

2. **Independent Election Audit Bodies (South Africa, Australia, France)**
   - o **Best Practice:** Countries like France and Australia have independent election audit commissions that cross-verify results before they are publicly released.
   - o **Lesson for Nigeria:** Nigeria do not need to have a separate Election Results Audit Council. INEC should establish an **Election Results Audit Committee** as an ad-hoc body activated

before every major election. This committee—comprising data analysts, electoral officers, and independent observers—should proactively review discrepancies within the **seven-day period allowed under Section 65 of the Electoral Act 2022** and recommend necessary actions before results are finalized."

3. **Strict Legal Consequences for Election Result Manipulation (Germany, Sweden, Canada)**

   o **Best Practice:** In Germany and Canada, officials found guilty of manipulating results face severe legal consequences, including permanent disqualification from election duties.

   o **Lesson for Nigeria:** A more rigorous accountability system should be enforced to deter result tampering, including criminal prosecution for deliberate vote inflation.

05.

Conclusion and Recommendations

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The 2024 Edo and Ondo governorship elections have once again highlighted both progress and persistent challenges in Nigeria's electoral process, particularly in election result management. While the introduction of digital tools such as the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) and the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) has enhanced transparency in some areas, systemic issues such as registered voter mismatches, arithmetic errors, missing ballots, over-voting, and inconsistencies between polling unit results and ward collation centre reports continue to raise concerns about the integrity of the electoral process.

The findings from the Edo and Ondo elections offer both reassurance and concern—while some progress has been made in preventing blatant fraud, inconsistencies in collation, unreported cancellations, and vote inflation persist. The findings of this report reinforce the need for a more structured and transparent result management process. The discrepancies observed in the Edo and Ondo off-cycle elections suggest vulnerabilities that could be exploited, or which were exploited, to manipulate results, ultimately undermining public trust in our democratic process. Addressing these issues requires not just technological advancements but also stronger enforcement of electoral laws, institutional accountability, and a commitment to electoral integrity from all stakeholders – including the election management body, political actors, civil society, and security agencies.

A democracy is only as strong as the credibility of its elections. For Nigeria to consolidate its democratic gains and build a political system that reflects the true will of the people, urgent reforms are necessary to ensure that election results are not only accurate but also widely accepted as legitimate.

The following recommendations provide a roadmap for strengthening election result management and fostering public confidence in the process.

Recommendations:

- **Strengthening the Accuracy of Election Result Management**
  - INEC should upgrade the EC8 forms to ensure that the number of registered voters is pre-recorded in official forms to prevent discrepancies at polling units and collation centres.
  - A more rigorous verification process should be adopted at each stage of collation to detect and rectify arithmetic errors before results are finalised.

- **Preventing Over-Voting Through Enhanced Voter Accreditation Checks**
  - Introduce a mandatory BVAS backendgenerated accreditation summary (attached to Form EC8A) to be uploaded on the IReV portal, ensuring that accredited voter numbers cannot be altered during collation.

- **Improving Transparency in Result Transmission**
  - The IReV portal should be upgraded to allow for result uploads beyond the polling unit level, ensuring real-time tracking of results at the ward, local government, and state collation levels.
  - A clear, publicly accessible database should be maintained even after the elections, allowing citizens, political parties, and election observers to compare results across different collation stages.
  - The BVAS-accredited number, otherwise known as the "synchronisation number", a feature on the IReV portal, which allows for the confirmation of overvoting on the IReV portal, was removed after the 2023 off-cycle elections. We recommend the restoration of this feature.

- **Enhancing Electoral Accountability**
  - A public complaints portal should be established before elections to allow citizens, parties, and observers to report irregularities directly to INEC, ensuring timely resolution before results are announced.

o Electoral officials found guilty of manipulating or mismanaging results should face strict penalties, including disqualification from future election duties.

- **Ensuring Fairness in Cases of Electoral Discrepancies**
  o In cases where discrepancies between IReV results and collation centre reports significantly alter the outcome of an election, INEC should establish a clear legal framework for reviewing such results before announcing a winner.
  o Contingency plans should be established to address incidents of missing ballots, ensuring that such cases are properly investigated and documented.
  o INEC should maintain a public log of all cancelled votes, listing reasons and affected polling units, to prevent unreported result cancellations.
  o If turnout exceeds 90% or there is a significant discrepancy between IReV and collation centre figures, an automatic INEC review should be triggered before result declaration.

- **Legal and Policy Reforms for Electoral Integrity**
  o The Electoral Act should be further reviewed to ensure stronger provisions for result management and penalties for electoral malpractice. It can start with INEC mandating digital collation for elections with more than 500,000 registered voters, ensuring large-scale elections have strict accuracy and transparency checks.
  o INEC should develop a standardised timeframe for result announcements to prevent undue delays that create opportunities for manipulation.

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Appendix

Assessing the Integrity of the Ballot: The 2024 Edo and Ondo Governorship Elections.

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2024 EDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

State: EDO
Local Government Area: ETSAKO WEST
Registration Area: AUCHI
Polling Unit: OPEN SPACE, MOMOH STR, EDELEBOR L UBOSON P/S

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1	A			
2	AA			
3	AAC			
3	ADC	2	TWO	
4	ADP			
5	APC	57	FIFTY SEVEN	Umar Zika Q...
6	APGA	1	ONE	
7	APM			
8	APP			
9	BP			
10	LP	5	FIVE	Abdulmalik A...
11	NNPP			
12	NRM	1	ONE	Jimah Ushio...
13	PDP	80	EIGHTY	
14	PRP			
15	SDP			
16	YPP			
17	ZLP	1	ONE	
18			ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTY TWO	
	TOTAL VALID VOTES	142		

(Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED

21-09-24
Date

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2024 ONDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N OG/C001377
FORM EC 8A

State		
Local Government Area	ONDO	Code 0 2 8
Registration Area	ESE-ODO	Code 0 7
Polling Unit	OPEN SPACE AT OJUALA IN FRONT OF OKADA PARK	Code 0 1
		Code 0 1 6

1. Number of Voters on the Register	296
2. Number of Accredited Voters	183
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	293
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	103
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	0
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	7
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	183
8. Total Number of Used Ballots Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	190

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED IN FIGURES	VOTES SCORED IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1	A	0		
2	AA	0		
3	AAC	0		
4	ADC	3	THREE	
5	ADP	0		
6	APC	99	NINTY NINE	OLADELE SEGUN
7	APGA	0		
8	APM	1	ONE	
9	APP	0		
10	LP	0		
11	NNPP	0		
12	NRM	0		
13	PDP	72	SEVENTY-TWO	OMOFENIWA LADUN
14	PRP	0		
15	SDP	0		
16	YP	0		
17	YPP	1	ONE	
18	ZLP	0		
TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)		183		

I, DIKE UCHECHUKWU CHRISTIAN (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED*

PRESIDING OFFICER
Sign/Stamp of Presiding Officer

16 | 11 | 2024
Date

STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2024 ONDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N: OG/0001591
FORM EC 8A

State _ONDO_ — ONDO — Code | 0 | 2 | 8 |

Local Government Area _IDANRE_ — IDANRE — Code | 0 | 8 |

Registration Area _____ — IROWO — Code | 0 | 6 |

Polling Unit — ST GEORGES AREA/OGUNDUYI ST GEORGES PRY SCH — Code | 0 | 0 | 3 |

1. Number of Voters on the Register		750
2. Number of Accredited Voters		173
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit		750
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers		577
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers		NIL
6. Number of Rejected Ballots		3
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)		173
8. Total Number of Used Ballots Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)		181

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED IN FIGURES	VOTES SCORED IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1	A			
2	AA			
3	AAC			
4	ADC	2	TWO	
5	ADP	2	TWO	
6	APC	88	EIGHTY EIGHT	
7	APGA			
8	APM			
9	APP			
10	LP			
11	NNPP			
12	NRM			
13	PDP	73	SEVEN THREE	
14	PRP			
15	SDP			
16	YP			
17	YPP			
18	ZLP			
TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)		173	ONE HUNDRED AND SEVEN THREE	

I, BASSEY COMFORT GIFT (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED

16/11/2024
Date

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2024 EDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N: EG/0001960

FORM EC 8A

State	EDO	Code 0 1 2
Local Government Area	IGUEBEN	Code 1 0
Registration Area	UDO	Code 0 5
Polling Unit	UDO EGUARE PRY SCH II	Code 0 0 2

1. Number of Voters on the Register	556
2. Number of Accredited Voters	179
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	556
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	480
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	0
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	2
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	174
8. Total Number of Used Ballots Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	176

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED IN FIGURES	VOTES SCORED IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1	A	0	ZERO	
2	AA	0	ZERO	
3	AAC	0	ZERO	
4	ADC	0	ZERO	
5	ADP	0	ZERO	
6	APC	072	SEVENTY TWO	Sam
7	APGA	0	ZERO	
8	APM	0	ZERO	
9	APP	0	ZERO	
10	BP	0	ZERO	
11	LP	03	THREE	Sa
12	NNPP	0	ZERO	
13	NRM	0	ZERO	
14	PDP	099	NINETY NINE	AB
15	PRP	0	ZERO	
16	SDP	0	ZERO	
17	YPP	0	ZERO	
18	ZLP	0	ZERO	
	TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)	174	ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FOUR	

I, ... (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/~~NOT CONTESTED~~

INEC PRESIDING OFFICER
NAME Christopher...
SIGN/Signature & Stamp of Presiding Officer
DATE 21/9/2024

21/9/2024
Date

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2024 EDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N: EG/0002866

FORM EC 8A

		Code	0	1	2

State: EDO

Local Government Area: OREDO   Code 1 2

Registration Area: URUBI/EVBIEMWEN/IWEHEN   Code 0 4

Polling Unit: IWEHEN/GUISI , FABIYI AKPATA PRY. SCHOOL 1   Code 0 1 2

1. Number of Voters on the Register	790	
2. Number of Accredited Voters	100	
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	790+1	
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	700	
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers		
6. Number of Rejected Ballots		
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	96	
8. Total Number of Used Ballots Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	100	

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED IN FIGURES	VOTES SCORED IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1	A	—		
2	AA	—		
3	AAC	—		
4	ADC	1	One	
5	ADP	—		
6	APC	32	thirty-two	Aye Origie
7	APGA	—		
8	APM	—		
9	APP	—		
10	BP	—		
11	LP	9	Nine	Osamwanse Preciox
12	NNPP	—		
13	NRM	1	One	
14	PDP	53	fifty-three	Okunbon osaighoud
15	PRP	—		
16	SDP	—		
17	YPP	—		
18	ZLP	—		

TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)	96	ninety-six	

I, OLaoluwa Saanu .... (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/~~NOT CONTESTED~~

Sign/Stamp of Presiding Officer

Date: 21/09/24

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
### 2024 ONDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N: CG000443
FORM EC 8A

		Code			
State	ONDO — ONDO	Code	9	2	6
Local Government Area	AKOKO SOUTH WEST	Code	9	4	
Registration Area	OKA II B ORIA/KOROWA/SIMERIN/UBA	Code	9	3	
Polling Unit	UBA II, LEBURU COMPOUND	Code	9	0	9

1. Number of Voters on the Register		434
2. Number of Accredited Voters		170
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit		170
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers		154
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers		0
6. Number of Rejected Ballots		8
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)		154
8. Total Number of Used Ballots Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)		170

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED IN FIGURES	VOTES SCORED IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1	A			
2	AA			
3	AAC	ONE	ONE	
4	ADC			
5	ADP			
6	APC	133	One Hundred Thirty Three	Isoa C Mercer
7	APGA			
8	APM			
9	APP			
10	LP			
11	NNPP			
12	NRM			
13	PDP	20	TWENTY	Afelunne Hour
14	PRP			
15	SDP			
16	YP			
17	YPP			
18	ZLP			
	TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)	154	ONE HUNDRED AND Fifty Five	

I, AKOIVO VICTOR (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/UNCONTESTED

Sign/Stamp of Presiding Officer

Date 16/11/2024

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
### 2024 ONDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N OG0002325
FORM EC 8A

State	ONDO	Code 0 2 8
Local Government Area	IRELE	Code 1 2
Registration Area	AJAGBA 1	Code 0 1
Polling Unit	LISA/JOMO/ADERO CAMP, AT LISA CAMP	Code 0 0 3

1. Number of Voters on the Register	493
2. Number of Accredited Voters	258
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	217 493
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	2.76
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	0
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	11
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	206
8. Total Number of Used Ballots Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	217

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1	A	Nil	= Nil =	
2	AA	Nil	= Nil =	
3	AAC	Nil	= Nil =	
4	ADC	2	Two	
5	ADP	Nil	= Nil =	
6	APC	96	NINETY - SIX	Kehinde Kw's
7	APGA	1	ONE	
8	APM	Nil	= Nil =	
9	APP	Nil	= Nil =	
10	LP	Nil	= Nil =	
11	NNPP	Nil	= Nil =	
12	NRM	Nil	= Nil =	
13	PDP	106	ONE HUNDRED SIX	AhichRua:
14	PRP	Nil	= Nil =	
15	SDP	Nil	= Nil =	
16	YP	Nil	= Nil =	
17	YPP	Nil	= Nil =	
18	ZLP	1	ONE	
	TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)	206	TWO-HUNDRED SIX	

I, Inyang Gladys Ithn (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED

Sign/Stamp of Presiding Officer

16 November, 2024
Date

2024 Ondo State Governorship Election : 28-12-01-003

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2024 EDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N: EG/0001960

FORM EC 8A

State		
Local Government Area	EDO	Code 0 1 2
Registration Area	IGUEBEN	Code 1 0
Polling Unit	UDO	Code 0 5
	UDO EGUARE PRY SCH II	Code 0 0 2

1. Number of Voters on the Register	
2. Number of Accredited Voters	656
3. Number of Ballot Papers issued to the Polling Unit	179
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	656
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	480
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	0
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	2
8. Total Number of Used Ballots Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	174
	176

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED IN FIGURES	VOTES SCORED IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1	A	0	ZERO	
2	AA	0	ZERO	
3	AAC	0	ZERO	
4	ADC	0	ZERO	
5	ADP	0	ZERO	
6	APC	072	SEVENTY TWO	OAAr
7	APGA	0	ZERO	
8	APM	0	ZERO	
9	APP	0	ZERO	
10	BP	0	ZERO	
11	LP	03	THREE	
12	NNPP	0	ZERO	
13	NRM	0	ZERO	
14	PDP	099	NINETY NINE	
15	PRP	0	ZERO	
16	SDP	0	ZERO	
17	YPP	0	ZERO	
18	ZLP	0	ZERO	
	TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)	174	ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FOUR	

I, ... (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/~~NOT CONTESTED~~

INEC
PRESIDING OFFICER
NAME: Christopher
SIGN:
DATE: 21/9/2024

21/9/2024
Date

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2024 EDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N: EG/0002886
FORM EC 8A

State _____ EDO _____ Code | 0 | 1 | 2

Local Government Area _____ OREDO _____ Code | 1 | 2

Registration Area _____ URUBI/EVBIEMWEN/IWEHEN _____ Code | 0 | 4

Polling Unit _____ IWEHEN/GUISI , FABIYI AKPATA PRY. SCHOOL 1 _____ Code | 0 | 1 | 2

1. Number of Voters on the Register	790
2. Number of Accredited Voters	100
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	790+1
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	700
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	96
8. Total Number of Used Ballots Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	100

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
		IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A	—		
2	AA	—		
3	AAC	—		
4	ADC	1	one	
5	ADP	—		
6	APC	32	thirty-two	Aye Origie
7	APGA	—		
8	APM	—		
9	APP	—		
10	BP	—		
11	LP	9	Nine	Osamwanse Precious
12	NNPP	—		
13	NRM	1	One	
14	PDP	53	fifty-three	Okunbon osaigheuse
15	PRP	—		
16	SDP	—		
17	YPP	—		
18	ZLP	—		

TOTAL VALID VOTES (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above) | 96 | ninety-six |

I, _____ Olaoluwa Saanu _____ (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/~~NOT CONTESTED~~

Sign/Stamp of Presiding Officer

21/09/24
Date

FORM EC40G (PU)

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
RECORD OF ELECTION NOT HELD/CANCELLED AT POLLING UNIT LEVEL

84846

ELECTION TO THE: GOVERNORSHIP

CONSTITUENCY: EDO NORTH _____ CODE: _____

STATE: ~~KOGI~~ EDO _____ CODE: 12

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA: OWAN EAST _____ CODE: 16

REGISTRATION AREA: IVIADAOBI _____ CODE: 10

NAMES OF POLLING UNIT: ESE PRIMARY SCHOOL CODE: 011

TOTAL NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS (In Figures and Words): 504 FIVE HUNDRED AND FOUR

TOTAL NO. OF PVCs COLLECTED (In Figures and Words): 326

REASONS FOR ELECTION NOT HELD/CANCELLED (TICK)

OVER VOTING	✓
BVAS NOT REPLACED AFTER FAILURE	
DECLARED EMERGENCY / DISTRUPTION	
UNABLE TO DEPLOY MEN AND MATERIAL	

NAME OF PRESIDING OFFICER: ESEZOBOR OMOMOH HUSSEINA

DATE: 21/09/2024

TIME: 4·23pm

SIGNATURE: _____

STAMP: _____

2024 Edo State Governorship Election - 12-16-10-011

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
RECORD OF ELECTION NOT HELD/CANCELLED AT POLLING UNIT LEVEL

ELECTION TO THE: **GOVERNORSHIP**

CONSTITUENCY: _____ CODE: _____

STATE: **ONDO** CODE: **28**

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA: **AKURE NORTH** CODE: **05**

REGISTRATION AREA: **IGOBA / ISINIGBO** CODE: **05**

NAMES OF POLLING UNIT: **OROJUDA** CODE: **020**

TOTAL NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS (In Figures and Words): **(97) NINETY - SEVEN.**

TOTAL NO. OF PVCs COLLECTED (In Figures and Words): **(43) FORTY THREE**

REASONS FOR ELECTION NOT HELD / CANCELLED (TICK)

OVER VOTING	
BVAS NOT REPLACED AFTER FAILURE	✓
DECLARED EMERGENCY / DISRUPTION	
UNABLE TO DEPLOY MEN AND MATERIAL	

NAME OF PRESIDING OFFICER: **UCHE DAVID O.**

DATE: **16/11/2024**

TIME: **8:30am   2:30pm**

SIGNATURE: _____

STAMP: _____

INEC
PRESIDING OFFICE
NAME:
PON: _____ DATE:
ELECTION:

ELECTION TO THE: GOVERNORSHIP

CONSTITUENCY:_____ CODE:_____

STATE: ONDO CODE: 28

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA: ILE-OLUJI/OKEIGBO CODE: 11

REGISTRATION AREA: ILE-OLUJI VI CODE: 06

NAMES OF POLLING UNIT: EYINGUON/ABA TEACHER CODE: 003

TOTAL NO. OF REGISTERED
VOTERS (In Figures and Words): THREE HUNDRED AND NINE - 309

TOTAL NO. OF PVCs
COLLECTED (In Figures and Words): _____

REASONS FOR ELECTION NOT HELD / CANCELLED (TICK)

Reason	Tick
OVER VOTING	✓
BVAS NOT REPLACED AFTER FAILURE	
DECLARED EMERGENCY / DISRUPTION	
UNABLE TO DEPLOY MEN AND MATERIAL	

NAME OF PRESIDING OFFICER: JOHN DANIEL EKEKWE

DATE: 16th NOV. 2024

TIME: 7:43pm

SIGNATURE: _____

STAMP: _____

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
RECORD OF ELECTION NOT HELD/CANCELLED AT POLLING UNIT LEVEL

20001

ELECTION TO THE: GOVERNORSHIP

CONSTITUENCY: _____ CODE: _____

STATE: EDO CODE: 12

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA: ESAN NORTH EAST CODE: 04

REGISTRATION AREA: UZEA CODE: 06

NAMES OF POLLING UNIT: IDINEEGBON PRIMARY SCHOOL CODE: 013

TOTAL NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS (In Figures and Words): 144 One hundred and forty four

TOTAL NO. OF PVCs COLLECTED (In Figures and Words): 137 One hundred and thirty seven

REASONS FOR ELECTION NOT HELD/CANCELLED (TICK)

|	
OVER VOTING	
BVAS NOT REPLACED AFTER FAILURE	✓
DECLARED EMERGENCY / DISTRUPTION	
UNABLE TO DEPLOY MEN AND MATERIAL	

NAME OF PRESIDING OFFICER: Benjamin Olaniran Onireti

DATE: 21/09/2024

TIME: 8:30 — 4:00

SIGNATURE: _____

STAMP: _____

No 10 S.B. Abubakar Avenue, NAF Valley
Estate, Behind Mogadishu Cantonment,
Asokoro, FCT, Abuja, Nigeria.

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Union Bank, Aregbe, Osogbo. Osun State.

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